The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in 2012, together with a new governance model designed to hold the police to account, brought politics firmly into policing. Hitherto, the acknowledged convention was that operational policing and politics should be kept apart. The doctrine of operational independence appears to have been firmly endorsed by the recent Police Foundation Structural Review but it failed to mention a High Court judgement, which challenged this doctrine. (See R v Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire Police, 2017). This judgement, in making the PCC responsible for all operational policing activity, questions the tradition of constabulary independence. This is clearly an issue that requires further testing in the courts (Loveday, 2018)
The police have always seen themselves as apolitical, although that was a fairly contentious assertion. Many authoritative commentators believe the police to be on the right of politics (Reiner, 2018). Some of our earlier blogs commented on the extent to which police officers saw themselves as Conservatives.
Interestingly, the recently published structural review of policing from the Police Foundation (see Section 12), appears to accept without too much challenge that Police and Crime Commissioners are performing well in their role of holding chief constables to account. The possibility of political interference is dismissed without question. However, PCCs wield enormous power and there is considerable evidence to suggest that the current governance model does not adequately provide the means or resources to hold them to account (Bailey, 2015 and 2017). The current batch of PCCs were elected in 2021 and 85% of them are active members of the Conservative Party. This is a marked change from the position in 2012, when nearly one third of PCCs claimed to be independent. Research has shown that where the PCC and Crime Panel share the same political affiliation, objectivity may be at risk. The outgoing PCC from Devon and Cornwall made precisely this allegation and asserted strongly that politics should be removed from the equation (Bailey, 2017). Partisan politics would now appear to be the order of the day and this raises significant concerns around the need for, and delivery of, objective, evidence-based policing strategies.
There is no requirement for PCCs to have relevant skills, background or experience. Democracy and political agendas will always trump that. This can be problematic, given the only realistic way of removing them is by the ballot box every four years (Bailey, 2017). It is rather ironic that PCCs were introduced to hold chief constables to account but themselves have no effective scrutiny. There is only little acknowledgement in the Police Foundation Report that the current governance model may have some flaws around PCC accountability. Recommendation 45 suggests new legislation for the introduction of ‘recall referenda’, triggered by Police and Crime Panels with a two thirds majority, when PCCs no longer enjoy their confidence. There are just two grounds for this to occur and these are:
- Where the PCC has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
- Where the PCC has been found to have breached the Nolan principles of public life
If these conditions are satisfied, the Police and Crime Panel may proceed with a recall referendum, where just 10% of the electorate are required to terminate the PCC’s employment. What the Police Foundation Report fails to consider is the extent to which politics may get in the way of reaching objective decisions, especially where the PCC and the Police and Crime Panel are from the same political party. Tribal political allegiance could pose a significant threat to objectivity (See above)
There is no in-depth analysis in the Police Foundation Report about the effectiveness of Police and Crime Panels in scrutinising their Commissioners. As has been stated elsewhere in this paper, there is now considerable evidence that Panels have neither the resources, nor expertise, to fulfil their role. Most Panel members are local councillors, who lack the time, authority and continuity to be effective. Representatives on the Panel come from the relevant local councils. Their portfolios are determined at annual council meetings and it is not always certain that those who are best suited will be allocated to the Panel. Independent Panel members, on the other hand, are recruited for their professional skills and expertise. They are generally more committed, have greater continuity and are less prone to political bias. However, independent members are always in a small minority on their Panels. It seems clear that much more thought needs to be given to the role, power and resources of Panels (Bailey, 2017). When the governance model was first introduced in 2012, Police and Crime Panels were an after-thought. They were never intended to circumscribe the power of PCCs. It is now time for urgent reform (Bailey, 2017).
The clash between policing and politics is perhaps illustrated best when looking at the Metropolitan Police and the dismissal of two of its commissioners. In 2008, Ian Blair resigned after declaring he no longer had the confidence of the London Mayor, Boris Johnson. At the time, there was a Labour government, with whom Johnson repeatedly clashed. This situation was repeated earlier this year (2022), when Cressida Dick resigned after announcing she no longer had the support of the London Mayor, Sadiq Khan. As with the first ‘dismissal’, the government and the Mayor are from different political parties and there were clearly marked differences in policing philosophy. These differences are almost tribal in nature and have assumed centre stage, at the expense of critical evaluation of policing delivery and effective democratic governance. Some have argued for a complete overhaul of the governance model (Bailey, 2017), involving the introduction of highly qualified and professional PCCs. Given the adversarial nature of British politics, that appears unlikely to happen.
The need for democratic oversight of policing remains essential, especially given the serious and deteriorating loss of trust by the public in the police service, a point noted in the recently published Strategic Review of Policing. The challenge is to develop a system that acknowledges politics without being governed by petty tribalism, so that real progress, in terms of policing reform, becomes a reality. A half way measure might be to reintegrate police governance with local government, in a way not dissimilar to the London Assembly system. However, that will not take away the element of adversarial, partisan politics. Neither will it address the problem of equipping local councillors with the time, experience, expertise and commitment to their role on the Police and Crime Panel (Bailey, 2017). It seems clear that the role of independents needs to be expanded, as they bring greater professional experience, more robust commitment and are free from party whips (Bailey, 2017). It is disappointing that the Police Foundation has not explored further the importance of having independent PCCs and Crime Panel members.
Morale in the police service has plummeted and experienced officers are leaving in record numbers, which is deeply worrying. Surveys conducted by the Police Federation consistently paint a picture of a service at crisis point. The report from the Police Foundation commented lengthily and authoritatively about the need for reform but its recommendations fall short of what is required. This is a huge and very challenging task, perhaps best addressed by a Royal Commission, to undertake a rigorous review of policing, its role, recruitment procedures, supervision and training. Anything less will simply be seen as tinkering at the edges.
Dr Roy Bailey
References
Bailey, R (2015). Policing the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs): An examination of the current statutory political frameworks for holding PCCs to account – a case study of the Surrey Police and Crime Panel. Policing: A journal of Policy and Practice 9(4) 305 – 313 doi:10.1093/police/pav022
Bailey, R (2017). Policing the Police and Crime Commissioners; An evaluation of the effectiveness of Police and Crime Panels in holding Police and Crime Commissioners to account. Doctoral thesis, University of Portsmouth.
Bowling, B. Reiner, R, Sheptycki, J. (2019) The Politics of the Police 5th Edition, Oxford University Press
Loveday, B. (2018) Police and Crime Commissioners: Developing and sustaining a new model of police governance in England and Wales
January 2018 International Journal of Police Science and Management 20(2):146135571774897