The recent discovery within the MPS that one of its firearms officers has proved to be to date, Britain’s worst sex offender has sent shock waves across the police service. It follows on from a series of earlier cases starting with PC Wayne Couzens, sentenced to life imprisonment for the abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard in 2021 [Hyde 2023]. Alarmingly since the Everard case a further sixteen Met officers were to be convicted for a range of serious offences [Al-Othman 2023]. Recent data released by the Met indicates that more than 150 Met police officers are also currently banned form public roles following internal investigation [Quinn 2023]. These police investigations form part of the on-going total of 800 officers now under investigation for sexual and domestic abuse [Duffy 2023].
The legacy of professional indifference to police wrongdoing has been recently highlighted by the Commissioner Mark Rowley. He has stated that the Met had not applied the same sense of ruthlessness to guarding its own integrity that it routinely applied to confronting criminals. This fresh commitment to protecting the integrity of the Met is likely to be openly measured by outcomes following the completion of Operation Onyx, a review of officers and staff against which the Met has domestic or sexual incident reports [Duffy 2023].
Structural Considerations
It is clear that the nature and size of the problems confronting senior management in the MPS may require radical solutions not just in terms of supervision and culture but also in terms of structure. Recent recommendations have ranged from breaking up the Met into two or more police forces to dissolving the force and creating a new police service. Recently it has been suggested that in looking at reform of the MPS, the example provided by Northern Ireland could offer a realistic option. Thus, following the Patten Report the Royal Ulster Constabulary was to be abolished and replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland [PSNI].
As has been argued by one commentator, Kier Starmer, who had an advisory role in the creation of the PSNI, was right to cite that precedent recently ‘as the Met has similarly lost the confidence of half the population its meant to serve’ [Freedland 2023]. The same commentator was to claim that ‘the remedy should be the same for London as it was for Northern Ireland: scrap the Met and start again’ [Freedland 2023].
Based on a perception that the Met has failed in terms of both efficiency and legitimacy, which remain two tests that count both professionally and publicly, Freedland has argued in favour of a ‘new service’ under wholly new leadership and with a head of service ‘experienced in criminal justice but untainted by Met culture’ [Freedland 2023].
While the dissolution of the entire MPS might be seen as a step too far, there remain characteristics integral to the Met which make its internal management a continuing problem. With a total establishment of over 45,000 officers and staff, the very size of the organisation makes it less malleable and responsive to reform and also effective management. Even with an established hierarchy of rank the likelihood of the Management Board proving able to effectively monitor the everyday operations of such large numbers of officers remains problematic.
Organisationally, wide spans of control have never proved to be either the most reliable or sensitive method of control or oversight. It has in fact been the intractable nature of exercising effective managerial control within the UK’s biggest police force that has traditionally been one of the strongest arguments against recent professional argument encouraging police force amalgamations and the creation of ever larger units of policing [Loveday et al 2003]. As recent past experience within the MPS appears to demonstrate larger police forces can undermine both the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of local police services.
Re-allocation of national functions
There is, however, a further feature exhibited within the MPS which may also serve to undermine both its overall effectiveness and accountability. This relates to the fact that the MPS as currently constituted, has many significant national responsibilities which sit uneasily alongside its espoused local policing mandate. Thus within the MPS Specialist Operations Directorate, are a number of dedicated specialist units whose remit extends beyond the capital. These include the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection and Royalty and Specialist Protection Units.
It also includes the ‘Aviation Security Operational Unit’ and the Counter Terrorism Command which retains a national responsibility for all counter- terrorism strategy and tactical operations across the UK. This was to be created by an earlier merger of Special Branch and the Met’s Anti- Terrorist Branch. The Directorate having a clearly delineated national remit could, it might be thought, be better located within a separate national platform or placed within an already established national framework such as the National Crime Agency.
Creating a structure reflecting the national dimension of the work of the Specialist Operations Directorate would also merely replicate what obtains elsewhere as, for example in the US, where the FBI assumes similar responsibilities. The argument for reconstructing the MPS by relocating national functions has in fact been made by a former Commissioner of the MPS. As has been recently argued by this chief officer, the ongoing impact of MPS responsibility for national functions has in terms of its internal management proved to be quite severe.
The highly centralised management within the Met has been tolerated if not encouraged by the Home Office because the national and international responsibilities of the Met have allowed that department to rebuff any involvement by the London Boroughs in the control or governance of the MPS [Blair 2022]. Moreover, by encouraging and assisting in the adoption of an autonomous role for the Met, effective governance and accountability of the MPs has never enjoyed any real salience either [Blair 2022]. Thus, central Home Office intervention has helped sustain a centralised and remote management structure while also blocking the development of any effective local delivery platform based on the Boroughs.
Internal reconfiguration of the Met
Recognising and responding to the often competing national demands placed on the MPS has, as has been argued, come at the cost of providing an adequate provision of police service, at a local level. Additionally, increases in either police precept or officer establishment never appeared to percolate down to increases in police personnel at Borough level. As has been argued elsewhere, in the 1990s many London Boroughs were, as a consequence, actively canvassing to expand existing local authority provision or creating local ‘policing’ units based on existing models [Parks Police et al] already in operation locally in London [Blair 2009]. To this interesting challenge could be added a further problem. That pertained to the very police abstraction rate which remains a regular and on-going feature of the management of police personnel within the MPS.
High abstraction rates are a regular characteristic of police service delivery in the capital and may often mean that local commanders do not know from day to day how many officers may be available for local policing functions [Loveday and Smith 2012]. It also makes the implementation of long-term crime reduction strategies at a local level highly problematic. Yet because of the specific public order demands frequently placed on the MPS within the capital, the acute problem of abstraction rates is unlikely to be solved in either the long or short term without a radical reappraisal of how MPS establishment might in future be configured.
2nd tier police provision
This problem was to be first addressed by Blair as Metropolitan Commissioner and who was to introduce the ‘2nd tier policing model’ of PCSOs within which police could exercise control over all public patrols. As he argued, the police should actively attempt to take back a near monopoly of patrol ‘by delivering its own cheaper patrol service’ [Blair 2009:124]. In effect the PCSO initiative was specifically directed at undermining local Borough plans to introduce their own local service by way of neighbourhood wardens or ‘Citywatch’ schemes, [based on Amsterdam’s Stadtwatcht], which would create a two-tier police patrol system [Blair 2009:124].
Despite strong professional opposition, including that of the Police Federation to their introduction, the PCSO initiative was introduced with the 2003 Police Reform Act. Moreover, the value of ‘2nd tier’ patrol officers was to be quickly established. These officers would be committed to local patrol, would be recruited from diverse ethnic backgrounds while also addressing the gender issue in terms of officer recruitment.
Long term, the value of PCSOs was to be reinforced by the recognition among local police commanders that effective community/neighbourhood policing in the Boroughs was entirely dependent on PCSOs. This was because high abstraction rates even in a period of expanding police establishment, continued to remove large numbers of sworn officers from local service delivery in the Boroughs. One further characteristic of the employment of PCSOs was that they quickly became a central source of police intelligence for the Met across the capital [Loveday and Smith 2013].
Borough responsibilities
This suggests that future restructuring within the Met could be most effectively based on the combination of decentralised management down to the Boroughs along with a major recruitment initiative to significantly revamp and expand PCSO provision at this level. There is however an additional requirement which became evident as a consequence of the Cameron Coalition austerity strategy for public services post 2010. One reaction, among chief officers, to the 20% cuts required within the police service was a decision to reduce the number of PCSOs within all forces.
In the MPS the then Commissioner Hogan- Howe proposed, for example, to remove PCSO provision in its entirety within the Met. This was only to be stopped by the active intervention of the London Assembly which recognised the intrinsic value of the PCSO role, a value which appeared to elude the then Commissioner of the Met.
This interesting reaction might suggest that in future Borough police services should be based on clear delegation of responsibilities to Borough commanders, delegated budgets and some form of statutory protection which would curb the vagaries of a distant centralised management and arbitrary decision making within the Management Team. Past experience suggests, however, that only by way of statutory powers established at Borough level are locally based preventative policing strategies likely to be realised on a long-term basis.
Conclusion
Structure and function are of course inextricably connected. As a consequence of this it is very likely that some form of internal reconfiguration within the MPS could be of value. Top down command and control should be subject to review and replaced by effective delegation down to the London Boroughs. The Boroughs should be actively encouraged to engage in a fresh policing strategy which would require them to both invest in local policing while also establishing joint governance of the police at that level. Delegated budgets to local commanders would also provide some stability at local level and a stronger platform for future police service delivery.
Recently, within its 2023 Turnaround Plan a new Mission of ‘More Trust, less crime, High standards’ has been identified by the Met Police. This mission is designed to re-establish the earlier Neighbourhood policing initiatives begun in the early 2000s by providing a dedicated senior officer for each of the 32 Boroughs to establish a more visible relationship with communities [Met Police 2023]. These officers will be a point of contact for strategic partnerships, local authorities, residents and community safety partnerships. They will also lead local policing teams using additional police from the Uplift Scheme while making use of volunteers and Special Constables. This initiative has the support of the London Mayor who has publicly committed funds for an additional 500 PCSOs for London [Met Police 2023].
While this development is to be welcomed and provides a remarkable contrast to previous years of austerity and professional indifference, it should be subject to an immediate reality check. Rostering a Police Superintendent for each Borough is not of itself likely to provide the stable platform which local policing demands. Nor are 500 PCSOs, volunteers and Specials ever likely to fill the current void which characterises local policing in the Boroughs. This initiative could only be seen as a precursor to a much more fundamental restructuring which would begin to reshape policing in London. Such restructuring is likely to prove challenging if not painful for established professional hierarchies but is entirely necessary if it is intended to establish the MPS as, for the first time, London’s own police service.
Barry Loveday
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