The current malaise
The resignation of Cressida Dick as London’s Police Commissioner following a meeting with the London Mayor Sadiq Khan in which he expressed his lack of confidence in her leadership of the MPS only provided evidence of a significant decline in public confidence in the force. Yet the resignation has in fact attested to be something of a prequel to what has proved to be an avalanche of revelations concerning the operational role of the MPS. The MPS which remains the UKs biggest police force is now clearly facing a crisis of confidence both among the public but also internally within the organisation.
As the most recent discovery of the use of ‘non- disclosure agreements’ [NDAs] by its senior management team demonstrates, public denial and defensiveness within the Met have reappeared as cultural barriers to any challenge to its professional transparency and organisational integrity. This has most recently taken the form of denying any use of NDAs while at the same time threatening legal action against a retired senior officer for breaking her agreement not to publicly comment on her experiences as a senior police manager [Dodd 2022a].
This interesting managerial contradiction does however only follow a further revelation that in responding to the night vigil following the murder of Sarah Everard by an MPS Officer, those arrested were to be made subject to ‘Single Justice Procedure’ within which and unknown to the suspect, police evidence could be presented to a single magistrate who in the absence of a jury, alone decided guilt or innocence. Unsurprisingly perhaps police evidence relating to the Everard protesters proved sufficient for the Justice to find them guilty of offences identified by the arresting officers [Townsend 2020; Thomas 2020].
While the CPS was later to describe the charges as ‘absurd and damaging’ the adoption of such an unusual procedure may have been closely linked to a professional assessment at New Scotland Yard that the vigil for Sarah Everard had in fact become an ‘anti police protest’ [Ambrose 2022]. For the Senior Management Team, led by Sir Steven House, acting Commissioner after the departure of Cressida Dick, this appeared to be sufficient to justify the use of powers and procedures usually associated with authoritarian regimes. It also suggested that respect for the Human Rights Act, through the use of what appeared to be little more than ‘kangaroo courts’, was entirely in abeyance within the Met [Townsend 2022].
Loss of confidence
Problems surrounding the management of the MPS led by the then Commissioner, Cressida Dick were to take many forms. Most notable proved to be the abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard by serving police officer within the MPS. Although brought to justice the later response of the Commissioner in describing PC Wayne Couzens as a ‘bad un’ appeared to ignore wider factors surrounding the case. Not least of these was to be the marked reluctance of colleague officers to deal with incidents of public indecency involving the same officer along with his membership of a police WhatsApp group within which racist and highly misogynistic messaging was shared within it by serving officers [Quinn 2022]. Later a similar WhatsApp group based at Charing Cross police station and consisting of serving officers was to be identified within which highly racist and misogynist messages were shared by officers [Hamilton 2022].
Elsewhere two officers sent to preserve a murder scene were to take and share ‘selfies’ of the two black female murder victims [Hamilton 2022]. The resurrection of an ill managed and aggressive ‘stop and search’ strategy was found to be directed overwhelmingly against young members of the black community. Yet when concerns about the policy were raised with the then Commissioner, she had been ‘defensive and dismissive’ [Simpson 2022]. As the head of the MPS Black Police Association was to state ‘limited access to the Commissioner had meant warnings went unheeded over issues that association members raised’ [Simpson 2022].
One consequence of the series of cases questioning the professional and moral standards of serving officers within the MPS was a report from the then outgoing CHMICFRS, Sir Tom Winsor. Noting that the problem of a toxic police culture was not confined to the Met, he called for more investigations ‘to root out officers that were bigoted or violent’ adding that the more his inspectorate looked the more cases it would find’. He noted that the Charing Cross incident which led to the resignation of the Commissioner meant that ‘the people who have these attitudes need to be rooted out and thrown out’ [Simpson 2022 b].
Cumulatively however the series of cases appeared to demonstrate serious failings in police leadership and for the Commissioner a public relations disaster. This was to be best reflected in levels of public confidence in the Met recorded by polling on behalf of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime [OPC]. The OPC Survey first introduced by Boris Johnson when London Mayor as a means of holding the Met to account, found that public confidence in the MPS fell sharply over the five years the Commissioner held office and that in the majority of London Boroughs 50% or fewer believed that the force did a good job. The survey indicated both a fall in trust that the Met could keep people safe and also solve crimes. As important many senior Met officers now regard the survey results as a ‘key test of the Mets legitimacy’ and it was evidence of falling public confidence that was to trigger the Mayors decision to confront the Commissioner [Dodd 2022].
Chief Officer departures
The process leading to the resignation of the then Commissioner was to be challenged by her successor Acting Commissioner Sir Steve House who requested an official inquiry into the departure of that officer. Preliminary evidence form the inquiry led by Sir Tom Winsor suggest that it will conclude that the London Mayor wrongly ousted the Commissioner by not following due process and describing the Mayor’s decision making as ‘irrational and unreasonable’ [Dodd 2022b].
Yet the evidence suggests that in using public, or professional, confidence as an indicator of effective leadership this has well established precedents. This was to be first highlighted in Gwent Police where the PCC in 2013 asked the chief constable Carmel Napier to retire ‘or be removed’ on the basis of very low morale within the force and the ‘loss of confidence’ in her leadership among her officers [BBC News 2013].
A very similar situation was to arise within the MPS in 2008 when Boris Johnson as Mayor [along with Kit Malthouse, his deputy] was to inform Ian Blair Commissioner, without prior warning, that in a proposed vote of confidence on Blair remaining as Met Commissioner, he would as Mayor support a no confidence vote and that he was looking for a change in leadership at the Met [Blair 2009:270; 271]. Johnson was to explain that a change of leadership ‘would be best for the Met, for London and for him as Commissioner’ [Blair 2009:270].
These examples may only serve to highlight the very considerable powers which elected mayors and PCCs can exercise particularly in bringing chief officers to account on behalf of their ‘constituents’. These powers are not however balanced by any accountability mechanism other than to the electorate by way of elections every four years. While local Police and Crime Panels were created to interrogate the work of the PCC the Panels were given only limited powers and few resources. They are, as a result largely unable to undertake the statutory role set for them within the 2011 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act [Bailey 2015;2017].
The same Act does, however, give the elected PCC responsibility for both the appointment and removal of the chief officer and within which the perception of public confidence in the police has become a clear measure of the effectiveness of the chief officer. This has meant that any previous concern about the lack of accountability of chief officers has been replaced by similar concern as to the accountability of the PCC.
This problem has been compounded by a recent high court ruling [ R –v-PCC for South Yorkshire 2017] which has significantly widened the scope of the PCC by making that elected official responsible for all operational policing within the police force area [Loveday 2018]. The legislation passed by parliament early on by the Cameron Coalition government transformed police governance by transferring effective power from the chief constable to a civil authority. In doing so it reflected a deliberate political move by central government to place clear limits on the executive powers exercised until then by chief police officers. The full ramifications of this remarkable change in authority have yet to be experienced. They would however serve to question the claims made within the Winsor report concerning the treatment of the Commissioner by the Mayor and her resignation thereafter [Grierson 2022a].
No alarm bells at the Home Office
The growing level of exasperation expressed by the London Mayor as to the professional capability of Commissioner to lead the Met, did not appear to raise any alarm at the Home Office. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the Mayor’s concern was fully shared within that department. As was to be revealed by one national newspaper ‘multiple sources’ close to Patel [the then Home Secretary] in the months before the Commissioners departure, were to inform that newspaper of their grave concern over the Met under this chief officer. More significantly neither the Home Office or Downing Street attempted to publicly support her as her relationship with the Mayor steadily deteriorated [Dodd 2022a].
The interesting non-relationship between the Commissioner and the Home Office was in fact to be more clearly expressed within a job advertisement for the post released by the Home Office following her departure. As the advertisement explained ‘significant and sustained improvements needed to be made within the Met to restore public confidence and legitimacy’. This would require ‘inspirational leadership’ which would be required to address the serious failings within the force to deliver a ‘demonstrably more professional police force that better reflected the diversity of London itself’ [Johnston 2022]. As these Home Office press releases demonstrated there appeared to be a closely shared perception between the Department and the London Mayor’s Office as to the integral weaknesses of both the then Commissioners leadership and management skills.
The outgoing Commissioner was to subsequently warn against what she described as the threat of the ‘politicisation of policing’ and where the operational independence of the police from both local and central government remained crucial for an effective democracy [Grierson 2022b]. Yet successive police failures under her watch only served to amplify a high level of leadership and management ineptitude within the force. In addition, and contrary to her own claims, there was little evidence that police independence was either ‘crucial’ for effective democracy or a ‘model’ respected around the world. In fact, the disasters confronting the MPS at this time suggested that such intervention was both necessary and belated. Clearing the Augean stables appeared not to be a role that could be now meaningfully exercised by a serving Commissioner.
And yet this model of operational independence it might be argued had been seen to fail some years before. Evidence for the need for change was in fact to be highlighted within the Henriques Review into Operation Midland undertaken on behalf of the MPS [Henriques 2020]. Identifying a series of major failings, not least the deliberate deception by police officers of a district judge responsible for issuing search warrants, the Review was to conclude by recommending a rigorous investigation of Operation Midland within which Henriques had established that a serious criminal offence had been committed by the police investigation team. Despite reassurances from the then Commissioner Bernard [ now Lord] Hogan-Howe that this would be undertaken Henriques was to later note that ‘no such investigation was ever attempted’ [Henriques 2020: 299]. Yet the debate over operational independence and the current role of directly elected PCCs/mayors in local police governance could be made entirely irrelevant as a new national policy has been unveiled in the course of the Conservative Party leadership election.
Return to Central Direction
As has been identified by Liz Truss, now Prime Minister, that she would establish a national framework of performance targets to which all police forces would be made answerable [Dathan 2022]. This strategy is expected to be overseen by the National Policing Board [NPB] set up in 2019 by the Johnson government and which is now chaired by the Home Secretary [ Loveday 2020].
Ostensibly planned originally to bring together senior police officers and government the NPB will become the primary body to which chief constables will be accountable. Thus, where police forces fail to attain targets set for them the chief officer will be made directly answerable to the NPB. This will necessarily serve to circumscribe the role of local Police and Crime Commissioners and marks a return to what in the past was regular intrusive interventions in ‘local’ policing by the centre. Increasing the Home Secretary’s influence has also been, of course, one objective espoused by Priti Patel in relation to the MPS [Hamilton 2022].
This would be achieved by way of reducing the influence of the London Mayor over the selection and dismissal of the Met Commissioner. To this end the ‘independent’ review undertaken by Sir Tom Winsor was specifically tasked to ‘provide the home secretary with advice options and recommendations on how accountability and due process’ could be strengthened’ and to consider if changes could be made to ensure that the mayors ‘withdrawal of confidence would not automatically result in the Commissioners resignation’ [Hamilton 2022]. Early evidence suggests that the recommendations from the ‘independent review’ are likely to fully match the Home Secretary’s expectations [Dodd 2022].
Conclusion
The recent identification by HMICFRS that the MPS should be placed into ‘special measures’ to improve its performance has only served to place added pressure on its internal management and service delivery. As the UKs largest police force it is also the case that any perceived failure at the Met can, in terms of public opinion, quickly extend nationally to other police forces. Establishing an effective management structure is paramount as is the creation of an efficacious system of communication within the organisation. Internal restructuring to achieve these objectives is essential and yet without the existence of effective leadership established in parallel with this there must be concern that organisational and service aims and objectives are unlikely to be achieved.
The evident problem arising from this is the threat of central intervention and a real danger of ‘politicisation’ of policing. This threat is now about to be realised under a future Truss administration as police objectives are in effect imposed on the police service. Performance measures may, in one sense, be seen as a simplistic form of management but as a means of control it does in effect decide what the police service does and, as significant, does not do. Currently the sense of political direction suggests that central determination of policing policy and priorities is likely to become a primary feature which will characterise policing in England and Wales now and into the future.
Barry Loveday
References:
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