Time for internal management change?
Policing in England and Wales has once again returned to the top of the political agenda. This has been propelled by a major review of policing from the Police Foundation which has recently presented a range of proposals to improve police effectiveness and service delivery [Police Foundation 2022]. Along with this has gone Police Inspectorate reports and a final review of policing from Sir Tom Winsor the outgoing Chief Inspector of police. Together these have raised significant questions and challenges about current policing priorities and structures.
None however have sought to directly confront the ongoing malaise that currently characterises the MPS, which with over 44,000 staff remains the UK’s largest police force and whose dysfunctional organisation is now in crisis. This pertains and stems from a management system designed to both exclude the public and the majority of police personnel working within the MPS. An over centralised and top down command system has in effect produced one of the least effective and largely unaccountable police forces in the country. Arguably it is only when real and deep restructuring within the MPS is undertaken that meaningful change can be contemplated elsewhere.
The current disarray which now characterises policing in London needs to be resolved. The departure of the current Commissioner Cressida Dick besides generating a great deal of political partisan debate and mutual recrimination between the MPS and City Hall has taken place against a rather more troubling phenomenon. This relates to the alarming decline in public confidence in the police and where that decline in confidence appears to be most marked in London.
As a recent public survey undertaken for the Mayor’s Office for Policing has demonstrated currently within London’s 32 boroughs, 50% or less believe the MPS does a good job in their local area which represents a fall of 17% points since the last survey in 2017. Public polling on behalf of the Mayor’s Office was in fact introduced when Boris Johnson was London mayor and was seen as a way of holding the Met to public account. Such is its cumulative significance that many former senior officers now regard the polling results as a key test of the Met’s legitimacy [ Dodd 2022].
In the ‘court of public opinion’ the decline in confidence among London residents in the efficacy of the MPS over the last 5 years has been dramatic. It suggests that the Mayors increasing concern about the decline in confidence that the Met could keep people safe and solve crimes was entirely justified. While the survey did not provide reasons for the decline it would seem that successive police scandals and the apparent failure of police leadership in dealing with them may have proved decisive [Dodd 2022].
While the Conservative opposition in City Hall have sought to place the blame entirely at the feet of the current Mayor it is clear that all operational decisions surrounding the investigation of murder of Sarah Everard and the policing of the public vigil in her memory, were made within the Met’s Senior Management Team [SMT] and within which the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner were identified as key and highly influential members.
The undoubted salience of the SMT only reflects the remarkably centralised management system which has traditionally pertained in the MPS. This has been tolerated if not encouraged by the Home Office which, as has been argued most recently by a former Met Commissioner, systematically ‘rebuffed’ any involvement of the London Boroughs in the control of the MPS because of its national and international responsibilities [Blair 2022]. By encouraging and assisting in the adoption of an autonomous role by the Met, effective governance and accountability of the MPS never enjoyed any real salience. When combined, centralised control and ineffective governance put the MPS beyond effective scrutiny but it also laid it open to any chance event that might raise doubts as to its leadership. This serious weakness has of course been fully highlighted in recent developments which have engulfed the Met’s leadership.
The problem of overcentralized decision making within the Met has a long history and was in fact to be identified by Robert Mark who was to comment that within this structure ‘there was only a nominal pretence of democratic management’ and where ‘the Commissioner exercised unchallenged authority’ [Mark1978:82]. Most recently this was to be best demonstrated by [Lord] Hogan Howe as Commissioner, particularly in relation to the [failed] Operation Midland initiated under his watch. Yet it is clear that this management system can also be highly ineffective in overseeing the delivery of police services and may, as in the MPS actually serve to undermine it.
Most recently a Report from the IOPC has identified a culture of virulent misogynistic and racist attitudes among MPS officers [IOPC 2002]. In addition, a police Inspectorate Report has concluded that instead of protecting the public the police were in fact ‘putting them at risk’ [HMICFRS 2002]. Describing the MPS as a ‘dysfunctional organisation’ with a workplace culture where bigotry was commonplace a Times editorial was to comment on how the Met had sought to ‘protect its own rather than the public and ‘connived to cover up its failings’ [The Times 2022].
This specific charge related to the Daniel Morgan murder case where an independent panel found that the Met had failed to properly investigate corrupt links between officers and suspects in the case and had concealed or denied these failings. It noted that [Dame] Cressida Dick as Commissioner had been singled out for criticism by the panel investigating Morgan’s murder ‘for placing hurdles in the way of inquiries’ [The Times 2022]. Later in response to these criticisms the Met was to comment that it was deeply concerned at the criticisms and was ‘urgently reviewing systems’ [The Times 2022].
Creating a new role for London Boroughs
In a period of crisis which now confronts the MPS there is a need to look potential solutions which may begin to both re-establish public confidence in the police and the Mets reputational standing. This is likely to be best achieved by fundamentally rethinking the management of the service in London. One major correction would be to begin to establish stable platforms for police service delivery at the local level where confidence in the police could be rebuilt and to bring to an end the overcentralized management system which has for so long characterised the MPS. These platforms should be based on the 32 Boroughs which together compose the Metropolitan police area.
Recommending the location of basic policing units to the Boroughs would not represent in comparative terms a significant development. In New York, for example, the NYPD operates out of a local precinct structure which along with Compstat encourages police commanders to identify and focus on local policing challenges. The shift within London to the Boroughs would, however, have significant ramifications. For the first time the Boroughs might begin to experience a police service which would match the local spending on police precept which each Borough is required to raise for funding the MPS.
As has been argued elsewhere the level of funding required of the Boroughs has rarely if ever been matched by police presence in the area [Blair 2009]. This failure was to encourage a number of Boroughs to consider creating their own local police forces as increases in the police precept were never matched by increases in police numbers locally as those officers recruited could expect to be ‘spirited away into squads at the centre’ [Blair 2009:125].
As a former Commissioner relates Kensington and Chelsea were in 2000 proposing to set up their own constabulary to police the streets and one interesting consequence of responding to that proved to be the creation of PCSOs within the 2003 Police Reform Act. Giving overt responsibility to the Boroughs for local policing would appear therefore to be only a belated recognition of the value of devolving police service delivery to communities they represent.
There is however a further argument for devolution of the police. This relates to the on-going challenge of high abstraction rates that confronts most local commanders. Currently they have no control over the officers who are attached to the police unit. It is the case that at any one time many officers supposedly assigned to neighbourhood policing will be abstracted for other duties by the centre. This has meant, ironically, that for many Boroughs Neighbourhood policing has been entirely reliant on PCSOs who as non- warranted officers cannot be abstracted for other duties [Loveday and Smith 2009].
If, therefore, a stable platform for local service delivery is contemplated then this is best achieved by establishing it within local government. One former chief constable has noted in relation to the earlier creation of Basic Command Units that: ‘In my experience policing works best where there is a clear link between the BCU and the local political unit’.
He added that:
‘Unless there is to be a massive democratic deficit it is essential that the police service is so structured that it has a clear relationship with local government’ [ O’Byrne 2001].
The case for closer links with the local authority was in fact to be made by the Superintendents Association in 2005. The Association was to argue that as currently arranged the one feature of local delivery was, other than abstractions, the haphazard funding of BCUs where even within devolved police units enjoying significant devolvement it ‘was not uncommon for funds to be withdrawn at short notice to pay for force priorities [ PSAEW 2005:5]. Insecure funding served only to create greater instability and with it an inability to develop and pursue local policing plans.
Arbitrary interventions by police HQs only served to further destabilise local police delivery. In London this was to be reflected in the arbitrary decision by the SMT to create ‘super neighbourhood policing units’ whose boundaries would cover two or three Boroughs rather than one. It remains uncertain as to whether the Boroughs were ever consulted on this reorganisation prior to its introduction. It did however serve fatally weaken any commitment to neighbourhood policing across London.
Moving towards Municipal Policing
If effective devolution of policing to the London Boroughs is to succeed there is a clear need for it to be protected from the historical legacy of arbitrary interventions from the centre. For the PSAEW to achieve this, one essential requirement was seen as being the creation of a direct funding stream to the devolved units [BCUs]. As it argued:
‘Local commanders need the flexibility to determine their spending in line with agreed local priorities.’ And that where funding was not protected ‘the consequence was a diminution in trust between the local commander and the other partners’ [PSAEW 2005:5].
Interestingly the same Association was to recommend that in future the selection of local commanders should engage locally elected representatives, which it believed would ‘support the development of democratic legitimacy at the BCU level of accountability’.
This novel recommendation was to find support from a former chief constable. He has argued that in relation to BCU commands that it would be possible to create more local accountability between the local commander and local government unit if local government politicians were involved in the selection of the local commander and reinforced by using locally raised taxation to partially fund the local police unit. This was important if local accountability ‘was to be real and not cosmetic’ and it would also mean that ‘the local government unit has some ability to shape the style and content of local policing’ [O’Byrne 2001]. One further requirement would include the introduction of contract arrangements for local commanders that would tie that officer to the Borough for a period of at least 5 to 7 years. This would be needed to establish some continuity and confidence among partners at local Borough level. It might also bring to an end the velocity of circulation of middle rank officers which currently characterises the police service and which is difficult to justify where it undermines confidence among local partners.
Municipal policing would also bring, managerially, closer spans of control. This might prove to be a useful basis for challenging and changing an organisational police culture which has, within the MPS proved to be a matter of deep concern and which has also, for the Met, clearly contributed to the significant decline in public confidence in it. As has been highlighted by the London Mayor the Hotton Report from the IOPC has exposed evidence of racism, sexism, homophobia, bullying discrimination and misogyny among officers based at Charing Cross police station. He has expressed deep concern ‘by how public trust and confidence in London’s police service has been shattered so badly-not just by the Operation Hotton Report but by a succession of serious incidents’ [Khan 2022].
If a negative police culture is to be confronted there is a case for the dilution of a culture of police ‘law enforcement’ by way of encouraging diversity in the provision of public protective services. This might include a significant increase in the number of PCSOs and the ratio of non- sworn to sworn officers. One encouraging consequence of their introduction was a sudden acceleration in the number of recruits from ethnic minorities and this could be encouraged and sustained. Additionally, a significant expansion of street and neighbourhood wardens might also provide a further means to diluting a law enforcement culture with all the attendant cultural problems that arise from this. In this context the London Boroughs could provide the launching pad for a fundamental reform of policing by creating the platform for effective local delivery of policing services while also encouraging significant internal reorganisation of the MPS.
Barry Loveday
Bibliography:
Blair I [2022] Letter to the Editor, The Times, 17/2/22;
Blair I [2009] Policing Controversy, Profile Books, London;
Dodd V [2022] Confidence in the Met police is now at 50% or below in most areas, The Guardian 27/2/22;
HMICFRA [2022] An inspection of the MPS counter-corruption arrangements related to the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel March;
CHMICFRA [2022] State of Policing Annual Assessment, March;
Independent Panel [2022] The report of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, London;
Khan S [2022] I recall the bad old days. Never again, The Observer, 13/2/22;
Mark R [1978] In the Office of Constable An Autobiography, Collins, London;
Loveday B and Smith R [2014] A critical evaluation of current and future roles of PCSOs in the MPS and London Boroughs, International Journal of Police Science and Management 17:74;
O’ Byrne M [2001] Changing Policing: Revolution not Evolution, RHT, Lyme Regis;
PSAEW [2005] Moving Policing Forward- Proposals for the future, PSAEW, Pangbourne, Berks.
The Times [2022a] Met Misconduct, Britain’s biggest police force has tolerated corruption and faces a crisis of confidence, March 23rd;
The Times [2022b] Met hired more than 100 officers with convictions, March 23rd.