Introduction:
When an organisation can deny people their fundamental rights; when they can administer violence, sanctioned by the State; when they can prevent the free movement of citizens around public space – it is only right that democratically elected governments would want to have a significant role in how these functions are both considered and applied. In liberal democracies, there is a necessary authorising rapport between professional policing and government – a relationship that acknowledges both political requirement and the professional independence of policing via the Chief Constables. This is a form of governance that should exhibit in-built trust, whilst at the same time, afford freely elected governments the capacity for intrusive scrutiny of policing action where appropriate. This relationship is a finely tuned contract that has democratic ideals at its core.
In this ‘Take Four’ article we seek to explore whether there is increasing evidence that the necessary space between politics and policing is being gradually eroded. On the one hand, have police officers themselves become more party-politically aligned; on the other, have carefully calculated party-political arrangements and appointments systematically undermined the ideals of democratic policing? Finally, we consider whether the current policing structures and processes hinder the ability for a unified professional policing narrative to be appropriately articulated? There will be views from the UK and USA
Take One
Politics within policing: the sociology of law enforcement
The celebrated scholar, Professor Robert Reiner, has written extensively about the sociology of policing for over three decades. His knowledge and authority in this field are second to none. His exploration of police culture, in which he drew upon the work of other leading academics, remains essential reading for all students of policing and law enforcement.
Reiner builds on earlier research by Skolnick (1966), which attempted to describe and define the ‘working personality’ of a police officer. However, as noted by Reiner, Skolnick’s work failed to draw out the political dimensions, an important component of police occupational culture. Reiner argues that politics is therefore a critical consideration in the analysis of policing.
Through research, we know that policing remains for many officers more than just a job: it is a vocation with a worthwhile purpose. There is a sense of mission, where the objective is the maintenance of a valued way of life and the protection of the weak against the predatory. However, it can manifest in a set of sub-values, in which cynicism, pessimism, suspicion, isolation and solidarity can all figure prominently. This engenders a feeling that the police are a beleaguered minority, which is about to be overrun. Only the police, in this interpretation, can comprehend the scale of the challenge.
Reiner asserts that the police service was, and largely remains, an occupation drawn from the working class, including chief constables. Evidence suggests the police are conservative, both politically and morally. This may not be surprising, given the nature of their work, the hierarchical rank structure and their perceived mission. Reiner further notes that the police have frequently been pitted against organised the Labour Party and the Left.
Brogden and Ellison (2012) take this further and claim that State policing is, and always has been, partisan. Now, as then, it is those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale (the ‘Other’), who bear the brunt of police attention. They argue that policing has always been committed to the maintenance of a divisive social order. Summary justice for those on the margins of society continues unchecked.
Party Political Affiliation
In terms of political affiliation or support, studies conducted in the 1970s and 1990s suggest the police are overwhelmingly Conservative. One study found that 80% of police considered themselves Tory supporters. Worryingly, 18% of that group identified as far right. Reiner (2010) said,
‘The police became a Tory-leaning partisan political lobby. A ‘bobby lobby’ emerged, spearheaded by public interventions by prominent chief police officers and by the Police Federation’s embracing of the Conservative Party’s espousal of law and order as an electoral issue. This played a crucial role in Margaret Thatcher’s election victory in 1979.’
Despite this clear evidence of Conservative support, the police have consistently opined that policing should be politically neutral. It would be interesting to see whether these findings would be replicated in 2021 and with the arrival of Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012, the role of politics has become even more apparent. PCCs are affiliated to political parties and 85% are members of the Conservative Party. There are few, if any, safeguards to ensure that candidates going forward for election have the skills, knowledge, authority and wisdom to undertake such an important role (Bailey, 2017). Democracy trumps all of that.
Some of the recent candidates have attracted censure over their public statements. While Police and Crime Panels have a duty to hold PCCs to account, they are largely ineffectual, principally due to inadequate powers and resources. It is also important to note that these panels are similarly political and where the PCC and the Panel members are drawn from the same party, there can be a conflict of interest (Bailey, 2017)
Policing is inevitably political, yet it is clear that it should not be politicised in the sense that it becomes party political, or working in support of sectional interests. The evidence suggests that policing is a long way from achieving political neutrality.
Such dominance by one political party in shaping policing views at a cultural and governance level is problematic. At a time of increasing populist nationalism, a monopoly of the crime agender by Tory PCCs, and a right-wing populist government, the enormity of this objective cannot be overstated.
The extremes of behaviour
With the rise of populism and authoritarian regimes, there has been increasing concern about the impact on law enforcement. The Washington Post on 10th January, 2021 reported that several serving police officers faced dismissal, suspension or other forms of discipline for their involvement in, or proximity to, the Capitol riot in Washington on January 6th, 2021. Sadly, this is not surprising, as there is evidence that white supremacist groups may have infiltrated American police forces across the US and is widespread (The Guardian Newspaper, 27th August,2020). While nothing of that magnitude has occurred in the UK, there is little doubt, judging from some aspects of social media, that serving and former officers are not necessarily fully immune from aspects of alt right populism. The Independent Newspaper on 5th March, 2020, reported that a young London police officer had been arrested for belonging to a proscribed organisation associated with right wing terrorism.
There are clearly worrying developments that should cause considerable anxiety to all liberal democracies and senior policing leaders.
Dr Roy Bailey
References
Bailey, R. (2013); Brogden, M. and Ellison, E. Policing in an Age of Austerity. A
Postcolonial Perspective. Policing 2013; 7 (3): 340-341. doi: 10.1093/police/pas060
Bailey, R. (2015). Policing the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs): An
examination of the current statutory and political frameworks for holding PCCs
to account – a case study of the Surrey Police and Crime Panel. Policing: A
journal of Policy and Practice 9(4) 305 – 313 doi: 10.1093/police/pav022
Bowling, Reiner, and Sheptycki, 2019, The Politics of the Police (5th Edition)
Skolnick, J, 1966, Justice without trial
Take Two:
Policing and Crime Commissioners (PCC)
As has been confirmed, the arrival of party politics in the PCC elections is now a feature of local police governance. The initial elections, whilst experiencing a low turnout did see the return of a number of Independent candidates along with a mix of Tory and Labour PCCs. In the subsequent election which coincided with local council elections the ‘Independent’ element was significantly reduced and replaced by a two way divide between Conservative and Labour PCCs. The most recent [and delayed] election has however seen a quite dramatic result with the Conservative party taking responsibility for 85% of PCC roles with that party achieving 10 election gains.
This election result has provided the Conservatives with an overwhelming presence in police governance. It is also likely that the Johnson government will change the voting system to ‘first past the post’ which may well serve to further reinforce that party’s control over local policing. In the absence of any supporting committee system there is no alternative party representation to offer some counterbalance to this near monopoly. This situation is already being identified as potentially dangerous to the public awareness and perception of PCCs. As has been argued recently in the media:
‘Conservative gains help to consolidate the Home Secretary Priti Patel’s power over the country’s police forces’ [The Guardian 2021].
As recent incidents involving the Home Secretary have demonstrated, interventions from the Home Office can be expected –not least on the back of a favoured strategy which involves the resurrection of a full-blooded performance management approach which we can expect to be rigorously enforce at a local level.
Irrespective of the powers which accrue to the PCC under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011) in relation to the chief constable, it is evident that local discretion cannot be exercised in opposition to central government priorities. Nor will there now be any kind of political filter to protect chief officers from a central agenda informed by a Home Secretary recently described as ‘illiberal’ in her politics and outlook [Guardian 2021].
While in some PCC jurisdictions committee systems have been established to support the PCC –as in West Midlands, there is no requirement for a PCC to do so. It will therefore fall to the PCC and the Office of the PCC to either seek to protect the local police force from the potential excesses of policy encouraged from the centre or alternatively actively support their implementation. Within the current febrile political environment taking the line of least resistance might be seen as entirely appropriate even where the chief officer expresses doubt as to the efficacy of centrally identified policing priorities which he/she is expected to pursue.
Erosion of local political engagement: fitness to govern
In previous PCC election cycles, it was noticeable that along with the election of many Independents, many successful candidates had previous experience of local government and partnerships, established under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. One further unfortunate feature of the now established PCC role has been the growing distance in terms of knowledge and experience among PCC candidates of local government and community partnerships.
The 2021 PCC election has served to highlight and reinforce this trend. This is particularly challenging as past experience tells us that the most effective unit of policing will be that which has close links with local public services if not coterminous boundaries with them [Moving Policing Forward PSAEW 2005]. In this context as police governance is now represented by one elected commissioner the absence of close links with local authorities or previous experience of them becomes increasingly problematic.
In the light of these challenges there must be a case for revisiting the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011) which accords very limited local engagement by way of local police and crime panels. These, as has been argued elsewhere, have neither the powers or resources to effectively engage the PCC. Moreover, where the PCC and panel members all belong to the same party little genuine scrutiny by the PCP can be expected, an expectation entirely fulfilled as recent research has demonstrated [ Bailey 2015].
Looking Ahead:
Arguably, there is now a requirement to review the current governance with a view to establishing or resurrecting PCC committees composed of local authority representatives along with members responsible for community safety in the PCC area. This might begin to re-engage with local democratic politics while also providing some counterbalance to the one-party monopoly which now characterises police governance in England and Wales.
References:
Bailey R [2015] Policing the PCCs A case study of the Surrey PCP, Policing 9[4] 305-313;
Murray J [2021] Police Czar warns over delays to rape and abuse trials, The Guardian 7 June;
PSAEW [2005] Moving Policing Forward-Proposals for the Future, Pangbourne, Berks;
Shipman T [2021] How the Tories Weaponised Woke, Sunday Times 13 June.
Barry Loveday
Take Three: our view from the USA
The ever-increasing drumbeat of the past year, demanding police reform in the United States, is complicated by the growing spectre of politicization of a profession that once prided itself on the value of impartiality (Lentz & Chaires, 2007)[1]. Over the past several years, partisanship and political divisions have infected all facets of life in America, and the profession of law enforcement was not immune. Where did this trend start?
Politicization of Policing
One could argue that the politicization of policing in America likely had its origins in the growing influence of police unions. As the union movement shaped the modernization of the American workplace at the turn of the twentieth century, the formation of police unions is generally accepted to have gotten their start in Boston in the early 1900s when city officers affiliated themselves with the American Federation of Labor in 1919 (Hodges, 2018).[2]
The practice of political candidates seeking union endorsements representing multiple facets of working society crossed over into the active solicitation of police unions to bolster a politician’s “law and order” bona fides. Such political activity on the part of law enforcement unions set the stage for the crumbling of the Peelian principle of the impartial application of justice.
During the election cycle of 2016, the FBI, an agency that demanded apoliticism on the part of its employees, was dubbed Trumplandia over indicators that agents were supportive of the presidential campaign of then-candidate Donald Trump over his Democratic rival Hillary Clinton (The Hill, 2016)[3]. In and of itself, this sobriquet should not have been surprising given the conservative reputation of the Bureau throughout its history under former Director J. Edgar Hoover’s leadership. However, the descriptor stands in stark contrast to the guiding principle of the Hatch Act and U.S. Department of Justice policy regarding political activities, which specifically further restrict FBI personnel from participating in any way in campaign activities for political candidates.[4] A restriction based upon the role of the FBI in investigating violations of federal election law.
Back to Basics
Career-long training and re-enforcement of the guiding principles of the policing profession should focus on the maintenance of public trust. Suppose police officers are seen to be singularly aligned to one political party over another. In that case, citizens seeking protection and justice at the hands of police may be less trusting of the profession if personal political views are in stark contrast to the opinions implied by a partisan political endorsement of an opposing political point of view. Police unions should voluntarily refrain from endorsing candidates for public office, and if not, legislatures should enact laws to ensure professional and organizational impartiality.
Maybe consideration should be given to abolishing policing unions altogether. Is it possible that the erosion of public trust in policing has been corroded over time by the unwavering support for officers who run afoul of laws, policies, and procedures when evidence of wrongdoing indicates condemnable actions on the part of an accused officer?
The tolerance of the public for police unions to stand behind the shield of due process is shaky at best when questionable police actions exhibit a lack of, to paraphrase a slogan of police agencies far and wide, due process in the execution of “protecting and serving.”
Freeing police leaders from the perception of political influence is a crucial step towards rebuilding better relationships between police and communities served. The current appointment of chiefs of police is a function left to the discretion of mayors and chief municipal executives who hold sway over their appointed employees. This arrangement is rife for opportunism, favoritism, and potential conflicts of interests when a police executive is beholden to the interests of the singular individual responsible for their hiring and continued employment. Selection of chiefs by independent appointment boards staffed by political and community leaders with no direct influence over the terms of work of the chief officer offers a path to community buy-in to work closely with local police leaders.
The shocking participation of current and retired police officers alongside active-duty and veteran military personnel during the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol[5] was one of several factors signifying the urgency of police reform and the need to get back to a guiding principle of policing in the eyes of Sir Robert Peel, “To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to law…” (Peel, 1829)[6]. The credibility of policing and its future is at stake if the profession doesn’t get this right.
References:
1 Lentz, Susan A., and Robert H. Chaires. (2007) “The invention of Peel’s principles: A study of policing ‘textbook ‘history.” Journal of Criminal Justice 35.1: 69-79.
2 Hodges, B. (2018, April 2). What police unions do (and why it matters). Police1. https://www.police1.com/legal/articles/what-police-unions-do-and-why-it-matters-Dl1MptG2fXOZZAmH/.
3 Devaney, T. (2016, November 3). Agent: FBI is ‘Trumplandia’. TheHill. https://thehill.com/regulation/304225-agent-fbi-is-trumplandia.
4 United States Department of Justice. (2020, October 26). Political Activities. The United States Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/jmd/political-activities.
5 Examining the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol — FBI. https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/examining-the-january-6-attack-on-the-us-capitol-wray-061521
6 The Peelian Principles | UW Police. http://police.uw.edu/faqs/the-peelian-principles/
Dana Gillis
Take Four:
The Elusive Voice of Policing
If policing is becoming even more political in nature, where is the counter narrative coming from within the profession?
Trying to locate the voice of policing leadership in an increasingly complex and contradictory politicised environment, is a challenging task. At a macro-political level, a democratically elected Home secretary is certainly a key influencer on leadership approaches. Whilst at the micro-political level, through the use of their vested statutory powers, a Policing and Crime Commissioner (PCC) may claim to disproportionately influence the policing leadership narrative via their ability to hire and fire the most powerful of formal leaders, the Chief Constable.
Individual Chief Constables would highlight their operational independence and thus profess to rightly speak on behalf of their local force. However, there are 45 of them each with territorial responsibility. As members of Chief Constable’s Council and the National Police Chiefs Council, they also have a collective organisation – with 12 sub-committees each headed by a Chief Constable. This seeks to influence government policy on behalf of policing.
The College of Policing, a professional body in England and Wales, purports to set policing standards, provide training and share good practice. An obvious leadership voice, yet it has to date, failed to make the impact its original inception intended. In an attempt to increase its impact, it has now recruited a Conservative Peer as its Chair. A man who had previously been a Policing Minister. Is this the voice?
The Superintendent’s Association state they are an influential voice in policing for the public good; the Police Federation seek to ensure that the views of their members are accurately relayed to government, opinion formers and key stakeholders; the trade unions and staff associations represent specific interest groups and non-sworn police staff. A voice can also be found at the National Crime Agency, the Border Agency the HMICFRS and the aligned arrangements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. All operate with genuine intent in a densely crowded landscape. Lastly, let’s not forget the policing of the police by the Independent Office for Police Complaints – or whatever it is called this month! They have a voice, though their own professionalism, like policing itself, is being constantly questioned.
At the operational end of policing, there have always been leadership voices that disproportionately influence direction. These are informal leaders whose entrepreneurial skills help them turn strategy into action in a manner that aligns to their own informally sanctioned discretionary practices. These leaders have what Foucault calls ‘subjugated knowledge’ – a form of understanding that is not formally recognised within managerial systems. This is also close to what Chan calls recipe Knowledge. These informal leaders fully acknowledge the organisational requirement, but they want to implement policy in their own way! Their leadership voices are heard by operational colleagues with the same shared assumptions about the nature of policing. Above all else, they understand the tragic nature of policework (Ker Muir) and dislike interference from elsewhere – particularly from their senior leaders. They find the complexity above them – too exhausting! In a culture that spends much of its time judging the moral character of others (Sacks), the voices of operational officers tend to influence their immediacy and consciously step back from the political machinations of their senior leaders.
These are all competing voices currently vying for the leadership narrative around policing. Yet, the current structures have the potential to silence a cohesive and unified countenance by continually creating multiple factions, with overlapping mandates. The danger with the existing approach is that there is considerable din but little clarity. The critical question that needs to be addressed is whether a professional approach to policing leadership is itself being undermined by the current multi-layered leadership arrangements? Instead of policing experiencing unity through a cacophony of leadership expression, has it been replaced by an over-structured, intensely political and over-complicated impotence?
Some argue that the current structures evidence a healthy counter-balance within modern democratic policing. Yet, is there so much balancing taking place that nothing of hyper-critical value is being added to counter a politicised landscape? As Crawford et al state:
In complex networks where authority is shared the various tiers of responsibility become difficult to disentangle and can become almost elusive.
When 85% of all PCC’s as well as the Chair of the College of policing are all align to the same political party, it is vital that the professional voice of policing is heard.
A Virtual Voice:
Meanwhile, through their creative use of social media platforms and in particular, Twitter, front line officers and staff articulate to an audience of many tens of thousands, a voice of policing reality. These voices are frequently raw, challenging, occasionally inappropriate but more frequently than not, thought-provoking. Unable to control the content of these accounts, moves are now afoot by some short-sighted policing bureaucrats to silence these popular voices in favour of a controlled corporate message.
There is much in policing leadership that needs addressed; let us add value to the debate by disclosing that the closure of Twitter accounts is not the answer!
References:
Chan, J (1997) Changing Police Culture. Cambridge University Press
Crawford, A et al (2005) Plural Policing. Policy Press
Foucault, M (1972) Power/Knowledge. Pantheon
Muir, WK (1977) Street Corner Politician. University of Chicago Press
Sacks H, (1978) in Policing: a view from the street. Goodyear
Dr Mark Kilgallon
Take-Four Conclusion:
There is little doubt from our perspective that policing in the UK is being purposefully politicised and that the previous balances of power, with appropriate safeguards within liberal democracies, are being undermined. We see too from our USA input, that the relationship between politics and policing is becoming increasingly problematic with explicit alignment between law enforcement professionals and lobbying politicians. The attack on the Capital, remains a moment of shame for some previous law enforcement officers.
Policing has always been political; now in the UK, it is being increasingly politicised through the overwhelming presence of one political party. If 85% of PCC’s come from the same party should there not at least be attempts to place a counter-balance of opinion within this governance set-up? This would be an informed source to PCC’s who themselves have a challenging mandate. The introduction of PCC committees with local authority representatives would be an informed progression.
We recognise that some of the current PCC’s have exceptional experience and knowledge, nevertheless, in such a critical role, we suggest a set of standards should be required of PCC’s that enhance their knowledge and experience to govern. We could suggest that this should be a quality and standards role for the College of Policing, yet their current independence must be questioned by the deliberate appointment of a Conservative Peer as their Chair! It is unhealthy for one political party to have this much influence on a critical role of the State.
This is a moment when there needs to be real clarity about the future relationships between politics and policing. It is also a moment when policing itself might want to review its present complex set-up. The density of policing structures, processes and interest groups within the organisation means that much is being generated, yet it is not delivering a clear and well-articulated vision for the future. Those at the front end of the business deserve greater leadership, because the last thing any democracy needs is operational cops and staff working in an environment where partisan politics becomes the cultural norm.